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The regulatory regime that governs the national security review of foreign
acquisitions of U.S. companies has drawn significant attention recently as a
result of several high-profile transactions. In 2005, the proposed acquisition of
U.S. energy giant Unocal by a subsidiary of the government-controlled China
National Offshore Oil Corporation was derailed by intense political pressure
and national security allegations that were never proven. In 2006, a similar
outcry forced Dubai Ports World (DP World), a United Arab Emirates state-
controlled entity, to relinquish control over the U.S. operations of the British
port management company it had acquired.2 Public criticism accompanied even
transactions that were successful, such as the $1.75 billion sale of IBM's
personal computer business to Chinese computer giant Lenovo in 2004. 3
Similar episodes of scrutiny mixed with criticism are now being played out
almost weekly due to the intensified activities of sovereign wealth funds-
investment funds that are closely linked with states.4
The frequent political opposition to foreign acquisitions can be driven not
only by genuine national security concerns, but also by protectionist impulses.
Consequently, the regulatory regime that is in place strives to pay due attention
to the former and to filter out the latter, all within the framework of keeping the
t J.D., Yale Law School, June 2007. Contact information: george.georgiev@aya.yale.edu.
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Take Over U.S. Firm Spurs Call for Retaliation, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A1; see also Joshua W.
Casselman, China's Latest 'Threat' to the United States: The Failed CNOOC-Unocal Merger and Its
Implicattonsfor Exon-Florio and CFIUS, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 155 (2007).
2 See Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., Stinging Defeat for Bush as DP World Gives Up U.S.
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United States open to foreign investment. Success in achieving this goal
depends on several specific choices made in the design of the mechanism for
reviewing transactions. As a starting point, the review process is likely to yield
different results depending on whether the primary oversight responsibility lies
within the executive branch or is shared with Congress or the courts.
Furthermore, the U.S. framework has a significant impact on other
jurisdictions' regulatory posture with regard to foreign investment. If the
United States is seen as using national security review to engage in
protectionism, this could provoke a protectionist backlash in other parts of the
world and hurt U.S. companies. Similarly, other jurisdictions could take
advantage of inadequacies in the U.S. regulatory regime and divert foreign
investment away from the U.S. economy through more liberal laws.
5
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (the Act),6
which was signed into law on July 26, 20077 and went into effect on October
24, 2007, is the latest effort to modify and update the regulatory framework
governing the foreign acquisition of U.S. companies. This Comment describes
the most important changes introduced by the Act and evaluates the extent to
which the updated legislation strikes a reasonable balance between addressing
national security concerns and maintaining the openness of the U.S. economy.
I. The Structure of CFIUS Review
The origins of the current regulatory system can be traced back to 1975,
when President Gerald Ford created the Committee on Foreign Investments in
the United States (CFIUS), an interagency body within the executive branch
chaired by the Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury
originally tasked CFIUS with monitoring the impact of inbound foreign
investment and coordinating U.S. investment policy. 8 The President's power to
act in this domain was formalized by the International Investment Survey Act
of 1976. 9 In the 1980s, mounting concerns over the acquisition of U.S. firms by
Japanese and British investors prompted Congress to introduce a system of
5 A similar process is well underway in the area of securities regulation, where problems
associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have shifted business away from U.S. financial centers
and toward European and Asian cities. See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, CITY OF
NEW YORK AND U.S. SENATE, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP (2007), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special-reports/
2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf.
6 Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061).
7 Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (July 26, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070726-
6.html.
8 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg 20,263 (May 9, 1975), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (Jan. 4, 1980); Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Jan. 9, 1989);
Exec. Order No. 12,860, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,201 (Sept. 8, 1993); and Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg.
10,619 (Mar. 5, 2003). For an overview of the early years of CFIUS activity, see JAMES K. JACKSON,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT No. RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 2-4 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
9 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (2000).
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formal review of these transactions through the Exon-Florio Amendment to the
Defense Production Act of 1950. 10 The Amendment authorized the President to
investigate the effect of foreign acquisitions on U.S. national security and,
acting based on "credible evidence," to suspend or prohibit acquisitions that
might threaten national security. 1  Prior to the Amendment, foreign
acquisitions could be blocked only if the President declared a national
emergency or regulators found a violation of federal antitrust, environmental,
or securities laws. Congress acted again in 1992, adding a statutory requirement
for CFIUS to carry out mandatory investigations of transactions where the
acquirer is "controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government," and
"seeks to engage in an acquisition that could affect the national security of the
United States.
The regulatory regime was developed further through a series of
Executive Orders13  and Department of the Treasury implementing
regulations. 14 CFIUS presently has twelve members, including the Secretaries
of State, the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce; the U.S.
Trade Representative; the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers; the
Attorney General; the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and
of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs; and the Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy. 15 The process of CFIUS review can begin either with a voluntary notice
from a party to a potential transaction or on recommendation from a CFIUS
member agency that believes a given transaction might affect U.S. national
security. 16 In practice, however, CFIUS has not initiated reviews but has
instead encouraged parties to not-yet-notified sensitive transactions to file a
notice voluntarily. 17
Neither the statute nor the implementing regulations provide a definition
of "national security," but they do contain a non-exhaustive list of factors that
may be considered when determining whether a threat to national security
exists. These factors include domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements, the capability and capacity of domestic industries to
meet national defense requirements, the control of domestic industries and
commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity
of the United States to meet national security requirements, the potential effects
10 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 5021, 102 Stat.
1107, 1425 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2158-2170 (2000)).
11 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(1).
12 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484 § 837, 106
Stat. 2315, 2463-65 (1992) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (2000)).
13 For a list of these orders, see supra note 8.
14 31 C.F.R. pt. 800 (2006).
15 JACKSON, supra note 8, at 6.
16 See National Defense Authorization Act § 2170(b).
17 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
EXON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW'S EFFECTIVENESS (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05686.pdf.
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of an acquisition on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to
countries supporting terrorism or raising proliferation concerns, and the
potential effects on U.S. technological leadership in areas affecting national
security. 18
Even though the 2007 amendments responded to several points of
criticism, they did not change the core structure of the CFIUS process.
Currently, after it receives notice of an acquisition, CFIUS may begin a thirty-
day review to determine whether the transaction could pose a threat to national
security. 19 At the end of this period, the Committee may conclude that no such
threat exists and end the review, or it may commence a forty-five-day
investigation. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the Committee is
required to submit a report to the President containing its recommendations.
20
Within fifteen days, the Office of the President may suspend, prohibit, or order
certain modifications to the transaction through a mitigation agreement, or it
may permit the acquisition by not taking any action. Regardless of the outcome,
it must submit a report to Congress explaining its decision.21 This structure
resembles the two-stage merger review process under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
22Act of 1976, but understandably involves much less transparency given the
sensitive nature of national security information. For this reason, and also
because the executive's findings are not subject to judicial review, the
confidence in the Hart-Scott-Rodino regime cannot be automatically transposed
onto the CFIUS framework.
The main benefit of a voluntary CFIUS filing for companies is that any
notified transaction with potential national security implications enjoys a
regulatory safe harbor, immunizing it against subsequent reviews or actions by
the President except in cases where the parties have engaged in
misrepresentations during the CFIUS process.23 In contrast, a transaction
without a voluntary filing with CFIUS that subsequently raises national security
concerns can be reviewed and unwound by the President at any time, even long
after closing. Another benefit of filing involves the opportunity for informal
guidance whereby the regulator and the company discuss the adequacy of the
filing and the expected shape of the CFIUS process. Although such guidance
can help companies to provide relevant information and not waste resources on
a transaction that is unlikely to be approved, the dialogue between the reulator
and companies has halted in the aftermath of the DP World controversy.
18 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(0 (2000) (pre-amendment).
19 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
20 31 C.F.R. § 800.504(b) (2006).
21 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g).
22 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2000).
23 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d) (2006).
24 See ALAN P. LARSON & DAVID M. MARCHICK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT 11 (2006).
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II. Criticisms and Defenses of the CFIUS Process
Most criticisms of the CFIUS review process have been prompted by the
high-profile acquisitions of the past few years. 25 Prominent among the
criticisms was the view that because CFIUS is chaired by the Department of the
Treasury, economic concerns would prevail over national security concerns.
Furthermore, the definition of "national security" was sometimes interpreted
too narrowly and the list of factors used to evaluate national security threats
was viewed as too vague. There have been arguments to include "energy
security" or even "economic security" as part of that definition. Finally,
Congress has complained that the review process is not sufficiently transparent
and that the White House has taken a hands-off approach, resulting in reviews
that are not sufficiently detailed.2 6
When evaluating these criticisms, it is important to remember that the
number of foreign acquisitions that require CFIUS review is very small and that
the potential for harm in the form of negative business attitudes towards U.S.
firms abroad is disproportionately large. For example, among the over 1500
notices filed with CFIUS between 1988 and 2005, the Committee found it
necessary to open an investigation in only twenty-five cases. 27 After
investigation, thirteen proposed transactions were withdrawn, while twelve
transactions were sent to the White House. 28 The President has used the
authority to block a transaction only once, in 1990. 29 Even assuming that the
withdrawn transactions would have resulted in a prohibition, problematic
transactions would still comprise less than one percent of all notified
transactions. The transactions which CFIUS needed to investigate comprise
only two percent of the total number of notified transactions. It should also be
remembered that ex ante control of foreign acquisitions is not the only way to
ensure that such transactions do not threaten national security. Problems can
certainly arise outside of a change of corporate ownership or control and,
consequently, there should be appropriate mechanisms for detecting and
remedying such problems. The CFIUS process should be seen as a small
complement to more comprehensive monitoring mechanisms and not as a tool
that can address national security concerns all by itself.
Finally, it is helpful to bear in mind that unsubstantiated alarmist
statements could originate from parties that are not unbiased or disinterested,
e.g., politicians representing domestic constituents with economic stakes, or
spurned bidders who would benefit directly if a transaction falls through. The
possibility that foreign acquisitions could be threats to national security is a
serious one, but it should not become a pretext for the stealth promulgation of
25 See supra notes 1-3.
26 See LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 24, at 13-24.
27 Fact Sheet: CF1US, WASH. POST, July 3, 2005, at F3.
28 Id.
29 See Stuart Auerbach, President Tells China To Sell Seattle Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
1990, at Al.
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policies in other areas, or for the defense of labor, environmental, and industrial
special interests.
III. Emerging Realities in the Markets for Investment and Regulation
The importance of striking an appropriate balance between openness to
foreign investment and the protection of national security is highlighted by two
emerging trends. First, sovereign wealth funds have come to play a larger and
more visible role in the global market for investment and their targets
frequently include U.S. companies. Second, the increased interplay between the
regulatory frameworks of countries seeking to attract foreign investment
suggests that the CFIUS regime can have unintended international effects.
The global marketplace has seen the emergence of a new investor type-
sovereign wealth funds that are either directly or indirectly controlled by
national governments. 30 As recent transactions have shown, the prototypical
new purchasers of major assets, such as a British grocery store chain
(Sainsbury's), large blocks of shares in global banks (Barclays and Citigroup),
or a U.S. stock exchange (NASDAQ) are government-controlled Chinese
companies and the sovereign investment funds of petrol-rich Gulf states. 31 The
substantial depreciation of the U.S. dollar in 2007 has made U.S. assets much
cheaper for foreign-based entities, be they governments, companies, or
individual investors. Domestic politicians may view some of these entities with
suspicion, but the capital inflows they bring are needed for the continued
economic strength of the United States.
On a more global scale, the modifications and the ongoing performance of
the framework regulating foreign investment in the United States are closely
monitored by other countries and could well set the tone for the degree of
openness to such investment worldwide. In recent years, a number of
jurisdictions have begun establishing CFIUS-style bodies or procedures,
including major U.S. trade partners, such as China, 33 Canada, 34 Germany, 35
30 See Tassell & Chung, supra note 4.
31 Keep Your T-Bonds, We'll Take the Bank, EcONOMIST, July 26, 2007, at 75; Simeon Kerr,
GulfArabs Flex Muscles for Global Buy-Outs as Funds Gain Confidence, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at
9; Joseph B. Treaster, Dubai to Buy Large Stake in Nasdaq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at CI; Steven
R. Weisman, Oil Producers See the WorldAnd Buy It Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at Al.
32 See Ralph Atkins & Krishna Guha, ECB Chief Points to Concerns Over Weak Dollar, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at 1.
33 See LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 24, at 8.
34 Shawn McCarthy, Ottawa Looks to Tighten Foreign Investment Rules, GLOBE & MAIL,
Oct. 3, 2007, at B5; see also Shawn McCarthy, Taqa Deal Faces Strict Review; Ottawa Will Weigh
State Control When Assessing Abu Dhabi's Purchase of Prime West, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 23, 2007, at
B3 (discussing internal pressure for review of the $5 billion acquisition of a national energy company by
a state-owned Abu Dhabi company).
35 Tony Barber et al., Germany Drafts Plans for Own CFIUS Deal Watchdog, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48128c56-6c82-1 ldc-a0cf-0000779fd2ac.html
(noting that the German regulatory framework is expected to be a "minimalist version" of the U.S.
mechanism).
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and the European Union. 36 Maintaining attractiveness to foreign investment
therefore requires a relative assessment that compares the domestic CFIUS
framework with those of other recipient countries. Some countries view the
U.S. regime as unnecessarily onerous and could attempt to create more
investment-friendly frameworks that would divert foreign investment away
from the United States. Others, such as China, could use national security
review as a pretext for blocking U.S. purchases of domestic assets, or at least
for raising their cost. Finally, the increased prevalence of arguments that use
the concept of "national industrial policy" could work to strengthen the
protectionist tendencies that already exist in certain European countries. 
37
Even in cases where the regulatory regimes do not differ formally, the
cost of generating negative publicity through politicization can be substantial.
In the case of DP World, for example, CFIUS approved the acquisition through
its regular review process, but members of Congress and other political and
economic actors criticized and ultimately unraveled part of the transaction by
forcing the sale of DP World's U.S. assets. Analysts have suggested that as a
result of this episode, foreign investment in the United States originating from
the United Arab Emirates alone fell by over $1 billion in 2006.38
IV. Evaluation of the 2007 Amendments
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 was the result
of reform efforts (and, ultimately, compromise) in the House and the Senate.
The more extensive House bill39 was eventually replaced with a Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee bill that paid somewhat
greater attention to input from the business community. 40 The final version of
the Act addresses many of the concerns of Congress: it strengthens the
oversight of CFIUS, codifies many existing good practices, and makes the
process more transparent. At the same time, the Act managed to avoid
proposals that would have placed onerous regulatory constraints upon CFIUS.
Overall, the Act appears to strike a careful balance between the need for greater
transparency and more detailed review on the one hand, and the interest in
promoting foreign investment on the other. In the very least, the reforms should
increase public confidence in the process and reduce the likelihood that future
transactions will be disrupted in the post-review stages, as was the case with
36 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European
Parliament: An Energy Policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1 final (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0001 en01 .pdf.
37 See Patrick Sabatier, Globalization d la Carte, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 18, 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/18/opinion/edsabat.php (discussing the French government's
opposition to PepsiCo's attempts to acquire national "industrial champion" Danone and to the purchase
of European steel giant Arcelor by the Indian Mittal Steel); see also European Takeovers: To the
Barricades, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2006, at 55-56.
38 DP World's Long Shadow, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2007, at 74-75.
39 H.R. 556, 110th Cong. (2007).
40 S. 1610, 110th Cong. (2007).
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DP World. 41 Nonetheless, much of the Act's effectiveness will be determined
by the content and the application of the new implementing regulations that the
Department of the Treasury must issue 42 and by the actions of members of
Congress during future CFIUS reviews. The discussion that follows focuses on
three of the most notable changes in the regulatory regime and on their
expected effects.
Perhaps most significantly, the Act increased the role of Congress and
created substantial congressional reporting requirements. CFIUS must now
inform the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, as well as the chairs and ranking members of the
congressional committees of jurisdiction, at the conclusion of a thirty-day
review process that does not result in a forty-five-day investigation, or a forty-
five-day investigation that does not refer a case to the President.43 The CFIUS
report must describe the transaction and the determinative factors in the
Committee's decision and certify that there are no unresolved national security
concerns with the transaction. Furthermore, CFIUS must submit annual reports
to Congress, and Congress may require a briefing on any transaction that has
been reviewed or whenever there is an issue of compliance with national
security mitigation agreements.44
While extensive, these changes do not go as far as allowing Congress to
block specific transactions or requiring mandatory notification to the
congressional delegations and governors of states likely to be impacted by a
transaction.4 5 The new provisions allow for greater transparency while
maintaining the evaluation and decision-making process entirely within the
executive branch. As such, they should not diminish the efficiency of the
CFUS framework but should allay concerns by members of Congress that
national security interests have not been respected. The congressional outcry
following the clearance of the DP World transaction was not anticipated by
CFIUS and both the Committee and the President were unable to provide
coordinated and persuasive evidence in support of the decision to approve the
transaction. 46 The changes in the regulatory regime would ensure that
whenever CFIUS decides to clear potentially controversial transactions, it
would be armed with a strong case in support of its decision and would be able
to respond more persuasively to close congressional scrutiny. Ultimately, this
could only raise confidence in the review process.
Another major change introduced by the 2007 Act is the expansion of the
factors that CFIUS may consider in evaluating transactions for their impact on
41 See supra note 2.
42 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, sec. 9, § 721(h), 121 Stat. 246, 259
(2007).
43 Id. sec. 2(b), § 72 1(b), 121 Stat. at 247.
44 Id. see. 7(b), § 721(m), 121 Stat. at 257.
45 Such proposals had been considered leading up to passage of the Act. See Douglas Holtz-
Eakin, You Can't Be CFIUS, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2006, at A8.
46 See Edward Alden & Holly Yeager, Arab Ally Senses That Bush No Longer Has Control in
Washington, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 8.
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national security. To the factors already noted,4 7 the new list adds the potential
effects of a transaction on critical infrastructure including major energy assets;
the potential effects on sales of military goods or technology to countries
posing a regional military threat to the United States; the potential effects on
critical technologies deemed essential to national defense (regardless of
whether the acquirer is controlled by a foreign government); involved foreign
nations' adherence to nonproliferation agreements, cooperation with counter-
terrorism efforts, and prevention of diversion of military technologies; and the
long-term projections of U.S. energy requirements.48 Because consideration of
these factors is neither mandatory nor dispositive, their addition does not place
rigid constraints on the CFIUS process, but it does suggest that the process
would be more probing. At the same time, the adopted version of the Act
avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on their counter-proliferation
and counter-terrorism policies.49 Such an approach would have rendered the
review process more formulaic and less effectual. The precise meaning of the
expanded set of factors that CFIUS may consider will not be clarified until the
Department of the Treasury updates its guidance on the types of transactions
likely to raise national security issues. It is important for the Department not to
overreach because actions based on an expansive conception of "national
security" could conflict with U.S. obligations under bilateral and multilateral
investment treaties which place a limit on the grounds for blocking inbound
foreign direct investment.
50
A third significant change in the regulatory framework is the
formalization of the role of intelligence agencies in the CFIUS process. Under
the 2007 Act, the Director of National Intelligence is required to provide
CFIUS with an analysis of the national security implications of a transaction
within twenty days of receiving a CFIUS notice. The Director is now an ex
officio non-voting member of the Committee. 5' Given the nature of CFIUS
review, it is likely that intelligence agencies were already involved in the
process. The codification of their role, however, will do much to dispel fears
that national security concerns are downplayed because the Committee is
chaired by the Department of the Treasury. This provision in the final version
of the Act once again struck a compromise between the status quo and more
far-reaching proposals suggesting that the CFIUS process be chaired by the
Department of Homeland Security, rather than the Department of the
Treasury. 
52
47 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
48 Foreign Investment and National Security Act sec. 4, § 721(f), 121 Stat. at 253.
49 See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 45.
50 See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investment
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 118-21 (1989).
51 Foreign Investment and National Security Act sec. 2(b)(4)(D), § 721 (b), 121 Stat. at 251.
52 See LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 24.
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V. Conclusion
The recent changes in the framework governing the review of foreign
acquisitions of U.S. companies responded to two interconnected developments:
the raised awareness of the potential national security risks associated with
foreign ownership of important U.S. assets and the growing frequency of such
foreign acquisitions by sovereign wealth funds. At their core, the 2007
amendments to the CFIUS regime provided additional statutory guidance for
the scope and content of the review process. They also increased its overall
transparency and the amount of information available to Congress, both in the
aggregate and with respect to specific cases. The drafters of the amendments
did not yield to pressures to adopt a number of highly restrictive measures with
questionable national security benefits; instead, they appear to have struck a
workable balance between maintaining openness to foreign investment and the
protection of national security. The real test for the amended regulatory
framework, however, will be in its implementation by the Department of the
Treasury, and in the ability of the executive branch to inspire and maintain
public confidence in the new CFIUS process.
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